Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c84c83d3c2662cad…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.7 KB Created: 2021-07-09 19:10:19 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: c24bbd5c256ffbdddc5e4f9748627177 SHA-1: cc14325bb6cebc811da8cbdff5c4c283a461ec4c SHA-256: c84c83d3c2662cad0cd1d6766e388a38d4ddf321bf7270c4eef948a9966cc38f
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of links, many of which point to compromised WordPress sites and other disposable hosting. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or distributing further malware. The primary attack pattern observed is the use of a link farm to direct users to potentially harmful external resources.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9961

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://xn--aknmedcal-wpbe.com/uploads/file/24145921812.pdf
    • http://enotecagaribaldi.it/userfiles/files/bijitetalimopumiredat.pdf
    • https://www.marthatrotts.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16090a994d2bde---77912420608.pdf
    • https://baodinhsolar.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/nl7dob9vun5j07s8a96r9k98f7/bulafaviwemamomobigawexur.pdf
    • http://nedirajtebosnu.net/userfiles/file/36775385963.pdf
    • https://stakeoutllc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/08bbce729a33b8b91e4666882c7d79b7/kebaxuxumipe.pdf
    • https://kozhikodedeaf.org/admin/my_files/file/satikoxagagonixegowebiw.pdf
    • https://thesmithgrouphouston.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c8dfe6554930368a32f1bed3462a3af3/30917109540.pdf
    • http://call.ae/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608be64ccb3d9---zupusumivisezutavo.pdf
    • http://yilip.net/userData/board/file/35501289242.pdf
    • http://clingac.com/d/files/nanipim.pdf
    • https://www.uniqueartzz.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/jhqpmkqe6epkootv7jcp5v8t30/sifovavojasedagaxun.pdf
    • http://automotiveenergy.cz/userfiles/file/54216311547.pdf
    • https://menlopark.com/wysiwygfiles/file/xikan.pdf
    • https://ccveg.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4k3jjh3ot1it1brggh52q8uhrj/zifirumukesogopave.pdf
    • https://anmoul.com/userfiles/file/suwikuvubaloxekobukipeded.pdf
    • http://chagatea.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d5ad117dca745c7b974d46ac8c5fd741/sozuzage.pdf
    • http://www.benvenutialmare.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160949c0bd6762---woreguka.pdf
    • http://www.emailposte.com/pictures/35894798198.pdf
    • http://carriewoodfamily.com/clients/5/5b/5b9f2fb360c4065436fb7fe1267c3612/File/dofixoluromaruwawenukija.pdf
    • http://tebsc.com/clients/84181/File/78128939292.pdf
    • https://www.kngroup.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bdd2bfafc03---sumuwewidukem.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/zMnd8XtcwSM/uplcv?utm_term=defining+a+strategy
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ef37.bin
e1b13a92dd8c7f30d149d96ddb16e09476a023f4bd267177ed75beaf9b8c0343
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF37 16720 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011a9b.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11A9B 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000132b2.bin
08870a2197b1d8e6f8391b72c39f59b563ce0a95c359ce282ae3a7ffe4becba8
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x132B2 10336 bytes