Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c846f757dc48b9ae…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

33.9 KB Created: 2020-02-25 05:41:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 700c9ffa9ddb4698b9e0509f4aeb5800 SHA-1: 1318a7ad4bf80f4495022065f31f8e5fda7e9810 SHA-256: c846f757dc48b9ae437fe52dd8953e11074fcc3974c281924c9b44e4c642f48a
80 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is a malicious OOXML document that uses a remote template injection and an external relationship to a malicious DOT file. The document body impersonates a military order to trick the user into interacting with the malicious content. The embedded OLE object is likely intended to deliver a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Remote template injection high OOXML_REMOTE_TEMPLATE
    Document references a remote template URL (http://polits.freedynamicdns.org/var/lib64/JJrSVV.dot) — a common remote-template-injection vector used by Hancitor, Emotet and many phishing campaigns. Word can fetch and apply the remote template; macros in that template may execute depending on Office policy and trust state.
  • External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels: http://polits.freedynamicdns.org/var/lib64/JJrSVV.dot
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
672dcd2c8abf62d1518d53b35300830dddbe1f070a090cd19ec4ebcc355aa63a		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 8704 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
8fcfd96c0bb4eb0dc030caea9c8bc351ffb713c39466b4a9cf5cfd5f6fbd68f1		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 896 bytes

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