RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · c8091ad978e57a0d

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

40.3 KB First seen: 2023-01-12

MD5: 63234921ee34f9100b160fbe6a6890e5 SHA-1: a5269e073b02966a0b33aa9169b65edc02224b8d SHA-256: c8091ad978e57a0d74ad4fb612c5148aadfd445a4f8fad64a4b6a62310b2c789

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to automatically activate the embedded object. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass security measures and trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00005285.bin` `79589c7bc7e92b3f3e59d04367240fc7c61e86ce54cd52e26c3716a35ee7c068`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5285	1415 bytes

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