RTF malware analysis — malicious · c7d0133367192a7c

MALICIOUS

RTF

88.7 KB First seen: 2024-08-13

MD5: 0ec5ddae9e2d5025ee5bcb87dd41aac6 SHA-1: 9c836bcb5cb4ecf9a3b5147d53dc6f115a240128 SHA-256: c7d0133367192a7c49d76387541b0d924474aff557527f77c63913e968aabc45

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation targeting Microsoft Equation Editor, including OLE object data and automatic linking. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` strongly suggests an attempt to leverage a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a secondary payload, leading to a full system compromise.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001d2c.bin` `e71c290bb8371977fb6fcc05c1a5f52b083547c9b94d085e0d02b770c26ee13c`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D2C	1799 bytes

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