Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c7b7f12ec2522057…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.9 KB Created: 2020-12-16 22:27:00 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f225f488d8d783ff7e934d3ef450881d SHA-1: 5d50bff8ccdd757e6bff62fe7c9bcde9ab903826 SHA-256: c7b7f12ec25220577fd0dbdab352fd392739a1c60897934abdc7f0ad89e22c18
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links to various domains, many of which are hosted on disposable platforms like Weebly. This behavior is indicative of a link farm, often used for SEO manipulation or to distribute malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution, hence the classification as Spearphishing Attachment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/strik?utm_term=remote+control+submarine
    • https://dopuxaponaxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695391/bobitukefib.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4443803/normal_5fd6dfa828800.pdf
    • https://pimakiwukusa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134712386/rogapapa-bugifiz.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369774/normal_5f9c45dcd5da2.pdf
    • https://jinobodusere.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134722577/7e7d175c0440.pdf
    • https://rovuxunezonode.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134494657/medotimutover_wexit_wunepivebofe_zipaxuko.pdf
    • https://fozixaxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134665632/8010668.pdf
    • https://naxizugopigonav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408516/simuginij_zuwofozom_rexagefofepe_riwemajugavalu.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/faxaxos/51115237064.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jamokaroxoj/sales_force_automation_system.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e9f9.bin
6d6aace6a91ac3220d6e6d036c7d4a862973c4ab795afec80dc9266b7cb19811		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE9F9 5092 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fb32.bin
4f319b8b54423ba6639f55e20b14424671d12fb614f1bf901fe54ed1887f1de8		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFB32 10608 bytes

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