Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c7a3edc71d5d11ef…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.4 KB
MD5: 8850c385329442496dfaf05a23ef1e63 SHA-1: f8611cf72c2e1f3d11a8a1dc5a29818885926b68 SHA-256: c7a3edc71d5d11ef5c873de9602f71b3f646c6e45590c1179f1a63e4e4a8a7e6
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded OLE object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common technique for delivering malware.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000007e.bin
0788303e487b1626be9940b708339592cc5a0e22beead0a86c9b1c35f871394a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7E 2014 bytes