Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c7670fffb6129cf8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

140.0 KB Created: 2021-02-07 17:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: da89ed101684b08c679f13ac5e3be7e6 SHA-1: 1a2fe2c816f4a9b776979981e1cda98f3b9f9529 SHA-256: c7670fffb6129cf8325bdd7d38564067036111a9c3983668802cb9b029bdc75a
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro that utilizes CreateObject. This indicates the document is designed to automatically execute malicious code upon opening. The presence of the 'Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0' ClamAV signature further confirms its downloader functionality. The VBA macros likely download and execute a second-stage payload, although the specific URL is not directly extractable from the provided metadata.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
62bcf9fc59ce61dd3c49f3ab6ac8462d1331f3f88fef9bb86b4aefbb161eb187
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2282 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
4fabb043d4f31e0825f60c43ecf92c79d1c4595a1c9925f60e44bbfacd5e9615
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 99328 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.