Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c75ecd8da080a142…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.21 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-30
MD5: e8297d2ac781efdfe4b936ef1f9484e3 SHA-1: ee482658d930442cbfe487938d2ed17e5cbcd8ad SHA-256: c75ecd8da080a142cacb8c8f6ed8d3fcb1b6b3f1a88490a122293a51b4b4dcb9
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the file contains a payload exploiting this known vulnerability. The presence of an OLE object related to Equation Editor further supports this. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body is minimal, suggesting the primary attack vector is the embedded exploit. The file's purpose is to execute arbitrary code via the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
f81b5dc0f134bff67b32850863689811e3ff1dad6ed5cd918403c20cc4d6ab1e		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00758CE2/Ole10Native 30803 bytes
ole10native_02.bin
1db30884e59628c5c2e0b3d4758004faf4694696b76d5888378808216bedfeb9		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00758CE9/oLe10naTiVe 2035 bytes

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