Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c74c4f541377f523…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

575.2 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: f7141d99f5493594b073eaaa09a8f705 SHA-1: 92a7e6282a20cf5075c4611abd92d33c6be5e6e5 SHA-256: c74c4f541377f523c0f14efdd366d92c7d186f5f5949c337041ce429518488d7
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor, indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further supports the exploitation of embedded objects for malicious purposes.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0008846d.bin
284cf4793274c5f4d5a09b7a0cf59d4ac3c58327219df13ba539d4b000db0e27
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8846D 3739 bytes