Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c715103810890970…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

32.4 KB First seen: 2023-04-11
MD5: b02b89d17c92d23902ca7ed6d17f4523 SHA-1: 73bea704306e16df6eeb170f8b754c2cfb1614c9 SHA-256: c7151038108909708473f719674d4cc4173ced191cd62539bafff2de692eec0f
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, triggered by \objupdate, which is a known technique for exploiting vulnerabilities. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, indicating a social engineering attempt to bypass security measures and execute the embedded exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000051f4.bin
9239e1272f3d5b8a5872d421a68f333cbe62edb82932debb877e71216cee34e7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x51F4 1725 bytes