Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c6faf7fbe16dba4f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.1 KB Created: 2018-07-25 03:00:21 +08:00 Authoring application: RAD PDF (via RAD PDF 3.6.1.0 - http://www.radpdf.com) First seen: 2019-12-09
MD5: 94257155906b0d8fea40e7920af11f1f SHA-1: 2cc19d951b2a41cae56c91f177c4826ea97d7015 SHA-256: c6faf7fbe16dba4fd6e7bdaca01c0344c4b223c82d1e75444037a0ffed9e4271
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file is identified as an image-only lure, typical of phishing campaigns. It impersonates a cloud document service and contains a clickable link that is obfuscated via a URL shortener. The embedded URLs, including the shortened one, are the primary indicators of compromise. The document's structure and heuristics strongly suggest a phishing attempt to redirect users to a malicious site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier clean score 0.0007

Heuristics 5

  • Image-only PDF lure links through URL shortener high PDF_IMAGE_LURE_SHORTENER_LINK
    PDF is image-heavy with little real text and its clickable action points to a URL shortener. This is a high-confidence credential-phishing carrier shape: the visible page is a screenshot-like prompt while the destination is hidden behind redirect infrastructure.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 2 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 76 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.radpdf.com In PDF document text
    • http://www.radpdf.com)/Creator(RADIn PDF document text
    • http://www.dynaforms.comIn PDF document text
    • http://google.com/PDF link annotation
    • https://bit.ly/2PBISz4In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://lucasfonts.comMicrosoftIn PDF document text
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_LicenseIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000040a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x40A 25628 bytes
SHA-256: c78b0ceb91c4f6fe23d1626fdc5493f9fe6fb15072207e48036c59e16c7def9c
font_01_sfnt_off00002fee.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2FEE 28988 bytes
SHA-256: 5d6396be57afe2633a009ebab29b915f45db5c85909747515068104f1ecf2261

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