Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c6db2619ba3b218b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.8 KB Created: 2021-06-30 22:30:06 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: a94253e61bc87c026683c2ffdefb3f57 SHA-1: ae9d5f34e3929b2515fdd5e86fce7b0c8e5b6918 SHA-256: c6db2619ba3b218b0410011429aa4204cf6df8fcbdd0768c729667c5110eb219
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is identified as malicious by ClamAV and ML classifiers, with heuristics indicating embedded JavaScript and numerous external URIs. The document body is heavily obfuscated, but the presence of embedded JS and a high density of links to potentially compromised CMS upload directories suggests an attempt to host and distribute malicious content or phish users. The primary attack pattern involves luring users to click on these links, which likely lead to further stages of infection.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9953

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://inwebjor.ru/uplcv?utm_term=find+the+focus+of+parabola
    • https://kompaspt1.com/contents//files/88064290178.pdf
    • https://event-connections.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16093b677eac68---riregudumu.pdf
    • http://seanmore.com/userData/board/file/zufavoxopewizevef.pdf
    • http://bpsstudio.hu/uploads/fazulutozotazi.pdf
    • https://www.quatainvestimentos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ca1f08d1ea0---sejixipexijomunuvakivib.pdf
    • https://cashofferoregon.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bbdc9fb45f4---19370295242.pdf
    • https://carstenrath.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/jrsal150uis5vi370drc6741da/bigibajag.pdf
    • https://www.kiteschule-eckernfoerde.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b220c3a93a---58834929559.pdf
    • http://ronaldtan.nl/images/photo/xubomararagusaranofu.pdf
    • https://irantruck.ir/data/file/71061589774.pdf
    • http://2girlstrippin.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160709641be0d7---takokijukozubutadeju.pdf
    • http://technoauto.jp/js/upload/files/90882212165.pdf
    • https://www.hed-endo.hr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bbfa656fe90---ruluzejosopodapigimifobu.pdf
    • http://79.170.40.182/boothtastic.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16093b030c7be9---fobufonimade.pdf
    • http://wignaccent.com/FCKeditor_2.6.3/userimages/file/20210617180535.pdf
    • https://kachhiproperties.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e26att3fuqka3nupcsr1s044d7/butoxubuzijuvuba.pdf
    • http://heritagecarletonplace.com/clients/c/c2/c23aa4fb54f25340752d20cfcff880b2/File/73545129962.pdf
    • https://www.verpoort-bouw.be/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c0b55200008---72569728101.pdf
    • http://habitat3.eu/userfiles/files/xafiwowavuwewakanaruvuwi.pdf
    • https://prosperitas.be/data/assets/file/90853339833.pdf
    • http://xn--80ackbssfuieecff0e8c.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/vkr15s2qdnmoee8e6q995f4qj5/gosapi.pdf
    • http://davidlbrooks.com/clients/868292/File/90134194985.pdf
    • http://ipsgroupjjn.org/userfiles/file/88933011573.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c600.bin
3c9fa85f08d700e395dc6379387251d9b411401a4949f04ed562434bb7bc53e6
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC600 16524 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f0f8.bin
befc6f1d089e3a6f6a0f420980941a3668152b5d5b08446ffaa8a48c9bcdc5ef
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF0F8 10932 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000109f3.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x109F3 16792 bytes