Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · c6b8ec482a3f91f4

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.36 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel

MD5: 4ef203ea548ee7b066c4cec87436aac8 SHA-1: 50eb79e516dc3fd1cbf20b7e3e1438c16232ec97 SHA-256: c6b8ec482a3f91f40f4281bdfaae026de6e14b3f3d0de58fcd7c1369a41d2820

130 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object. This exploit is designed to download and execute a remote payload from a specified URL. The embedded PDF also contains suspicious static findings, suggesting a multi-stage attack. The primary IOC is the URL used in the exploit.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE

PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://000000000000000000000000000000015CONTENTS��Ole

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`font_00_sfnt_off00002084.bin` `c85fb56c083e9f5398fa914648c00e763d0acec38b1a4110890e6838aa33ff04`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2084	46064 bytes
`font_01_sfnt_off0000666e.bin` `d6f185e3cb7aaf52da2cb4806d2680f3eac35e999aa48befaff41ffdae17c98c`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x666E	74893 bytes
`font_02_sfnt_off00010478.bin` `8bd44b2bd0c7e7bca792d391a220e13ef9d234739f4510439186484bd3469e53`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10478	70321 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf` `ad9e951d19c138add4a428a48e96380943396b7766b083defd20bec2d7dd2d1c`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000	1418752 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off0001b000.pdf` `69aa2b191f71eeea9f56b383a63e198f13897f14a56ccd7f4ebb05170c608286`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1B000	1312256 bytes

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