Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c6af1ac7a0ac1adc…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.06 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 95767a5f8dcc0f0c5c0ec4f77c48e302 SHA-1: 06ddc8fe764b30cdfc9b8bedb5d9fc02253c04a3 SHA-256: c6af1ac7a0ac1adcbc7a0d69e7e1fff986ee8ba0a2a1a1ae49d579f52805cc22
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, with a critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-8759. This indicates the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability upon opening, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of OLE object data and the specific CVE exploit strongly suggest a malicious intent, although the exact family cannot be determined from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00105ea5.bin
2e12dee80783e9ef51cbabb7398881e7b6883bf5612729e4a6f0167facb00cf8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x105EA5 1435 bytes