Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c6aa7756d40a40f0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.6 KB Created: 2020-08-30 06:16:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 835c6a019790b8e1d01366920a678425 SHA-1: 87e53a22373acf728760d9e6223157b4660d4555 SHA-256: c6aa7756d40a40f088909521cc8eee7a063afa3b05ce46e40a718373e602466c
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link, pointing to a URL that is disguised as a worksheet answer key. This URL is likely intended to lead the user to a malicious site. The file also contains a PDF link farm heuristic, indicating a large number of external links, many of which point to static.usrfiles.com. No scripts were extracted from this sample, but the presence of the malicious redirector and the document body content strongly suggest a phishing or social engineering attack.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=kuta+software+infinite+algebra+1+combining+like+terms+worksheet+answers
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_c53fce6494ad447ebf461da4fc0fe626.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/e2f7e1_98797e907ae941e1a814ba3ff9b8d84e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_ab1d35f27caf49f5a018856694e8090c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/87a178_3833c04d7af14f2f839d1a2add66b085.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/253000_13c1fb94a1914145b0476b3bf85a6e44.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b56239_b7d8ba586112479fb44905d3dc63ea4f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_25d91c7bdb5b46f9a90f6ebb338b124c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f14cf6_f36cd54442a94048ae86d95ae4938b75.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_896d32f8f627408d8385fc6365fe96c0.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e74b192ddd1b4f3e8f1d9e7986e3cbf2.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/565485_260467ca73204136898924cc976e9524.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/0286dd_2ed0dc4ae20b4af4b3480751b0b0a77c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_48aad82aea9f4dc9ae1c5ac7a2329b86.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_eed78987074f413aa1a7f32ec3bee87a.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000076df.bin
aea501349baa671db3bb303b4e6ca9e008e773c0b55e22f043c51ab6cc688c11		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x76DF 5612 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000089e1.bin
55e5f1ecf3aae2134d4556ef52a0f149f6b3e4b7f72559e181f6bdea90de1e88		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x89E1 13608 bytes

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