Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c6a0d0b89ecb6828…

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.3 KB First seen: 2019-11-20
MD5: fa001b54a0851fd160709117f6ddab53 SHA-1: d5bd3edccedbba2378cd837dfd667174193f3456 SHA-256: c6a0d0b89ecb6828ce720423d70742a44f05b37f049c9e90d88a8f0b4058bc9d
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics for Equation Editor exploitation and automatic OLE object activation. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution. The embedded OLE object data is likely a payload or a loader for a secondary stage.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000036.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x36 4138 bytes
SHA-256: 6670246e09ea705960006701171c4ce103051eff93d1fea50f66997e10647d0c