Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c69fceb26f3bec9b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.8 KB Created: 2020-10-29 04:53:35 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-12-26
MD5: b8f86d46d41db4051b4efb34f47e97f7 SHA-1: 1195b0a1828566773cd2f09a7fff455e652fcdc7 SHA-256: c69fceb26f3bec9b452d70ad00ef3f1d1559ce287dac9a5e4a58baad8f410a1c
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=is+rick+steves+gay In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383571/normal_5f9a08772ab4b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kifisiwa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266158/mokaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367310/normal_5f8bdf07a9ca0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mogilifus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739831/7805117.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://juragubiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874328/birozalulup-gojarubag-regobagediz-bepiza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sovopubi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775052/c1b02f1bf7cf5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368227/normal_5f88d7bf7851f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365621/normal_5f8712f05ba9c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369911/normal_5f8fb8ceec644.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369143/normal_5f894e565d076.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kotonimurapuva.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134440920/01581c22b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://betoxugibujimiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071043/sajuxa-xexojelapurarar-sezap-ragavulo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pexazunawilaga.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134265520/juwipeduvoten_nokunof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374979/normal_5f8d6584071f3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ximinelinax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134313791/nozagisagaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369504/normal_5f8be416d9ac0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006f0e.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006f0e.bin)
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/purawuma/list_of_words_ending_in_ology.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kavitokolezub/rebodemazalutejuro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wonoti/asme_bpvc_section_ix_2017.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8784962c-5b10-42b4-b296-19954ec7bfc3/72074394298.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/931345ea-c2e5-4b7b-8ad6-6557906296ec/69071654919.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/henghuili-files/99527790168.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006f0e.bin)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006f0e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6F0E 5100 bytes
SHA-256: 70f6dbbd5c330495ad61beabf9b42027e18145e77127fdf9f0a73f51ef1a303e
font_01_sfnt_off0000808e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x808E 10988 bytes
SHA-256: 003b8a9d99a364547816ac9a51cdc2030a0ee3af2ae96528f5bbdeae218fe4b5