RTF malware analysis — malicious · c69955cc5536c486

MALICIOUS

RTF

45.9 KB First seen: 2023-07-24

MD5: 31332915ea2a23d649e1ccb1c15c6a1c SHA-1: fd0891a653654ed62e2cf775acb0dfabbadf9e9e SHA-256: c69955cc5536c486d1e243b7d4f4e365ba043f72dcab8d202645a566615dbe75

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit delivery technique. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, which would trigger the ".objupdate" directive to activate the embedded object. This suggests the file is a dropper or exploit loader, likely targeting a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00005205.bin` `206cb22d125316da57b79b43e245ff8a2caa6c765608728e938305d5c4ed2ea7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5205	1854 bytes

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