Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c68b69ed11a1318d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

40.0 KB First seen: 2023-07-11
MD5: a83e6f6df3139c61ceacd87c890e809a SHA-1: 6a5f3789adc812b16a9c7fc2f3ef35ffa5b179d7 SHA-256: c68b69ed11a1318dcaac2a4fc45c46133fb94c69e78bbbf714febee806cefa8b
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate and a lure to 'Enable editing' strongly suggests the document is designed to trigger this exploit upon user interaction. This exploit likely serves as a dropper for a secondary payload, though no specific download URLs or scripts were directly extracted.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004248.bin
2d4e7ca0ba2a3528850337eabf86f43575d8e59545dc96a46f25e4973877baea
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4248 1916 bytes