Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c68444c765ef68e1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.2 KB Created: 2021-06-20 14:59:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-23
MD5: 10d2c2a665771e1663149546bf91a603 SHA-1: 72f4790ff0fd940dba927971a0d01cef9c6ca065 SHA-256: c68444c765ef68e1bb30f9f40904bc08f3f30536d0e4abbe4951216213129752
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Spearphishing Link T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was flagged by multiple heuristics as a phishing lure impersonating Microsoft. It contains embedded links that redirect to external sites, likely to harvest user credentials. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, supporting a high confidence assessment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/6naE_Nh8_CY/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+change+lock+screen+password+on+windows+10+laptop.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://massagetheory.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ef18dcbff9422331c6cc0a07635b7522/96456281500.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://call.ae/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607ab449cb07d---towukokoluwos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mrsinternationalbeautypageant.com/clients/8/8c/8c0f0497d7166b07b5568c04be8084ca/File/kaganavoneg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://campbellelectronics.com/uploads/setokew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://trichynext.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/02a7d20f6e0264fbdf3b40864057948d/3035475641.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.budgetskemaet.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608b9dca1275c---mamowukotuxizilavoza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ketoanaca.com/uploads/image/files/38826384817.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vankouwenenmastop.nl/UserFiles/file/52646435895.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://luisacortesearchitetto.it/userfiles/files/99003164652.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://staging.impactredevelopment.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a2d9d51c71e---mefalijuxenaruluv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.beadvised.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7e3c94d4c544580c61f047c0f5373be8/65251813955.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://unitedcardsolutions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a92b3804f8c---4919914021.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://x-software.cz/data/file/gumujazunen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/6naE_Nh8_CY/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+change+lock+screen+password+on+windows+10+laptopPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d853.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD853 5644 bytes
SHA-256: 406121c1068896f0b292fc97407368c1b682f8c515a03c91cccf9c65992866ec
font_01_sfnt_off0000eb97.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEB97 10364 bytes
SHA-256: 61f652539971bf2f66770090d2bea4ee90c0b139e902ff0eb59ca15b0b82bf9c

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