RTF malware analysis — malicious · c66193934887bee3

MALICIOUS

RTF

91.2 KB First seen: 2024-08-22

MD5: 28d95412db3a011684784953657efd12 SHA-1: 0a3734ee93c07b5f7c78766af2af63bb75984856 SHA-256: c66193934887bee3b03867ec20b6aa7448d5f38b2d82d122a0cd442676d87866

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening, leading to code execution. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, though no specific payload or download URL was directly extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000014e1.bin` `8ee6ea57dec6958b6603bf1fa25df31850409b4ad8808e40d99676c1a029e65d`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x14E1	1910 bytes

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