Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c638d8a094a9a00c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

70.5 KB Created: 2021-06-19 19:48:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-07
MD5: e657838ef4664337135dc48d820a217d SHA-1: d7a5ad3fcb82d81b5ff0a1bc62561947eb0c2d63 SHA-256: c638d8a094a9a00cb1b9c4c936f76e30a47329f80a88067cce4c12cb39e9907f
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1534 Internal Spearphishing T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and exhibits characteristics of a phishing lure. The document body, though partially corrupted, suggests a pretext related to changing Windows passwords, aiming to trick users into clicking malicious links. Several heuristics indicate the presence of link farms hosted on compromised WordPress sites and disposable domains, further supporting a phishing or credential harvesting intent. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://huntic.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+change+the+lock+screen+password+on+windows+10.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://huntic.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+change+the+lock+screen+password+on+windows+10 PDF link annotation
    • http://www.timtransportes.com/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bf57787d195---17036673787.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ive-cal.it/file/lajatobazirasuxemax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.qlsny.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/18be434cb3d92841b317a80a7f6fcc72/salimilazaluxemanup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://andrelandberg.com/userfiles/file/18965039991.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://iamluno.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ba06b3b43b2---19106870049.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.gcsystem.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082e5a5c1c96---77454179953.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sportsht.com/userfiles/file/34678504955.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://amagi.la/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160881e13b3fd2---13598173354.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alphacleanwashing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/30582354ba729471cbbbf8d52df64429/17291456400.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ncstarim.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/958dl6pjp5mb2bsk44gu3525g0/75951551897.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://payassistinc.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608850340c2f5---nasena.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://khiconghoixuancong.com/Khicong/admin/userfiles/file/vagizugatapo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ausafrica.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c5a37b6eeb3---pizufi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--80aaeiengkwpz6p.xn--p1ai/pub/file/38370372250.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ahi.com.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f4d2dd0133b84990ea2f54d0dfadf11d/99935235833.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d644.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD644 5644 bytes
SHA-256: 1d2ca746bbeb1c3439bcdd6c140efc15abb666d43c6a8b9c411d2168492fe016
font_01_sfnt_off0000e989.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE989 10364 bytes
SHA-256: 78a881a1fe531d840919bea117c5e6beb3868570d902bead168b7d7aaf3ad31d

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