Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c626c76972c6b4cc…

MALICIOUS

RTF

2.79 MB
MD5: cd19a3380d3e4bc697b176cba2e56c0c SHA-1: d203d6cbe939bcfe700539c33cd8d6f568c22f00 SHA-256: c626c76972c6b4cc0d8351b056fd493a06772f737af44523e1b5900b795f7b8b
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Equation Editor, which is indicative of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the embedded object is activated. The presence of large hex data blocks further suggests the hiding of a malicious payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~2924KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009d.bin
22a6d83cefd2e0ae5bbcac1153eb77804674f5874d084b04dde091c15024e02f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9D 974946 bytes