Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c611eb024510978c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

76.4 KB Created: 2021-03-11 19:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 546bb0b0fefec02d4fe15353eb4bfd61 SHA-1: 45f54c604b84ed6f25e6c827c3299db5f98d44ad SHA-256: c611eb024510978c892b74604c0590e7b16aff7d83bc67f4b77410a8044814ac
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains a VBA project with an AutoOpen macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The presence of a Shell() call within the VBA code strongly indicates that the macro attempts to execute arbitrary commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The heuristic 'EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE' also flags suspicious elements like encoded blobs and script execution terms, further supporting this conclusion. No specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e2badc9106f7bfc06af8f118190ca07f63a34b6b4759d5977d7f377956c9bb79		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5611 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 7 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
6019012e8ff408b383fdcec19412009307cdd60ab6a28a6ec8b8b9d9d4617537		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28672 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 7 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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