Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c60f4b72317cc0d6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.46 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-12
MD5: 7f0b021313aa7270c522abb6f430fd24 SHA-1: d2c9c5f95b7ee5adc711dc52769e0572a30fc1cf SHA-256: c60f4b72317cc0d6106204bfc5c667666cc40bc8e6f8cc622a1748e7b9c4f2cd
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The file is an Excel spreadsheet containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, contains a direct link to a suspicious URL. The VBA macros are benign and do not appear to contribute to the malicious functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
1702956e5043298e75974f0d2c964472385b241bf7cae9110888aef9261dc4ec		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00020452/OLe10NaTIve 1853 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000817d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009f95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
15c2b7ebe421b8521c8f41ff14842e6cbc7d297690f6590d4fe5d54322c93e33		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1529856 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdf
f1c55c6c786ff8134db9fdf45cb543448428eca5e2be014c72dcc4db7df39354		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 1508864 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e400.pdf
fa0930b12f25978336bba0be90b1d58f63f2e61fc99672e96f57361dede19ae6		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE400 1475584 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002d000.pdf
e3136b52f26c10ccfa6e5583684c6b333164c45eeccf9100a4d4bbe86e9c2821		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x2D000 1349632 bytes

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