Win.Dropper.Tspy-6680871-0 — RTF malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c60df55c2cc7fdb3…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.40 MB First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: afc72e995b6945600571f1349b6ced37 SHA-1: 4f9620c482703c5bfe4a1c5412cdf7627ae2bec2 SHA-256: c60df55c2cc7fdb3a62238158766059b5d673e8384d99cc40be5e937e8f5d4e4
482 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Win.Dropper.Tspy-6680871-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The RTF file contains OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics related to CVE-2017-8570, which is known to drop SCT scripts. The presence of a PE header within the hex-encoded data further suggests the embedded object is a Windows executable payload. ClamAV detection confirms this as Win.Dropper.Tspy-6680871-0, indicating it's a dropper designed to execute a secondary malicious file.

Heuristics 11

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Win.Dropper.Tspy-6680871-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Dropper.Tspy-6680871-0
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1234KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 7 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography In RTF body
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn RTF body
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000031.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x31 617164 bytes
SHA-256: 9aec1bc7818b4665a39e7098f9a918c2595e7c63457673a9ecd06dc953f6a414
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Dropper.Tspy-6680871-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryExA, VirtualAlloc, GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualProtect
objdata_01_off00132001.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x132001 100044 bytes
SHA-256: 2ebd21766daef37fce64b8a10b6642481ac67d2583f6c14a0ccf856fef16ce39
objdata_02_off00162dd1.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x162DD1 381 bytes
SHA-256: b16269ed74bbb54da900998b9d0ff6db6fa04de76d87c7ece4414f4b2b9dc5a1
objdata_03_off00163107.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x163107 790 bytes
SHA-256: ac6dd4416a3c69b34bc166b4ed3a98acdc14d43308526869ffa1b6809c8901d7
objdata_04_off001637b1.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1637B1 2633 bytes
SHA-256: 1feb5f150bb35566d1a01fc59a357dc0ea34bc7498e0ec99bd939f6f848044b0
objdata_05_off00164cd9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x164CD9 4679 bytes
SHA-256: 6bb172535cccd16de71bca846e2bb6df177c56b3a545d6e6314435eabf5d2217