Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c5cbefae90991f5a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.2 KB Created: 2021-03-19 21:00:06 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-08-25
MD5: fa75b7582e724b98f351ac3185d1e39a SHA-1: 28b25ba672e1afb2337fb1627b7f3f07da0f4420 SHA-256: c5cbefae90991f5abb3acb1c315981a5f8327cfa68b47cd900032c095a11dc96
186 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm for SEO manipulation. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or distributing further malware. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous URLs point towards a malicious campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9964

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://xajibur.ru/wix?keyword=cube+runner+unblocked PDF link annotation
    • https://laxuwipulave.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135956831/dapiviniwokaka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bugasidajuw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856032/a945ca7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/rubalibuzodi/Gqiic3n/22908932313.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4383308/normal_5fdf3c95275d9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4495837/normal_602531a21efa9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4482617/normal_603b3ff6136f2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4465402/normal_5fcbd7a065705.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383689/normal_60464a734d06b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nawamuzimosu/Xggcha6/soluriziliw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zugimawaxudal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131410952/sumozeli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sefedajexoxoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134479396/c6ed0c90.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4458631/normal_603b7b51cbe5c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/labojime/1jcfIgh/wazuwedenuzadusudi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jokawefezo/Jejaxig/can_you_download_flappy_bird_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jitaginedisa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134324559/5648328.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sanepawoja.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134579143/jadunubebozatuj-fidurefaponi-nuridabizasake-xuveri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4374522/normal_5fce596caac11.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vekazedivipi/dyehfgf/52284274155.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fogoranamixite.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135390362/bogodojesa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4472204/normal_6024090fa2bab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mijonezogiju.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134308960/fakebagubugaviwuguz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://muwirejevom.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857435/1753383.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3600a979-e75b-42c3-bd6d-ab9e70ff965e/xozejigipapaxima.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ca5503b8-b7c6-4e58-9d0e-533d144cc180/how_to_program_remote_with_liftmaster.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9de4762d-f449-4ac3-8b20-b00c68b3a600/cephalexin_davis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7c86a022-5edb-4500-906e-ea6aac6508c7/bedexipi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e93c622f-381e-4c51-967b-34635c52dbe1/diwutebewepijunidif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fcb2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFCB2 4652 bytes
SHA-256: f9c6e0ec51266a465baafdc4c47fed74a34d40256298a69563286d2d63801f5e
font_01_sfnt_off00010c88.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10C88 11356 bytes
SHA-256: 77940faee15340497dd134da1e4d2c1462feeb50a740bc1ad6b3722183ed3bc4

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