Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c5a6dff3ff90d80a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.4 KB Created: 2020-11-14 02:08:29 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 4bd5ba058e20ec5735d846e706a9c6da SHA-1: be8328fd8a73cbdf4a98935d7d98999d5402d04d SHA-256: c5a6dff3ff90d80a36ef2f407c45c9a5f822329ade35f6cc6634539500ff30e8
206 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

This PDF file is identified as malicious by multiple heuristics and a machine learning classifier, with ClamAV detecting it as Pdf.Phishing.Trojan. The document functions as a link farm, containing numerous external links to PDFs hosted on disposable domains, likely for SEO manipulation or to distribute further malicious content. The presence of a callback lure heuristic suggests a potential phishing or tech-support scam pretext.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 7

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafftec.ru/aws?utm_term=biochemistry+concept+map+pdf
    • https://sifixiwip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134596292/makekinobuf.pdf
    • https://xojerajap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384359/rumetefeme_zapefi_xibepar.pdf
    • https://mijagevamosekur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134515139/4369959.pdf
    • https://mikezopa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134366842/sominusoxik.pdf
    • https://pituzidadago.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134722752/4652155.pdf
    • https://dosaremuxabibi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739916/966153.pdf
    • https://mepafuxutare.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134660934/6741250.pdf
    • https://zixamagexiwu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134012381/2211756.pdf
    • https://zoludapi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134528767/9616143.pdf
    • https://vuvonuzomuvi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134508102/6609271.pdf
    • https://nidixinaxob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739699/fewuw.pdf
    • https://bilewobadazape.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695578/2682796.pdf
    • https://warajepij.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134608856/2c986c9d91.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xurixado/27731995631.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f7c9.bin
c439a2a94db7998439ddda9707005728d0d9c04e6662e0026ce45ad06dc1b994		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF7C9 5304 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000109a2.bin
f433019432d33b46e13b93200d89ac9eee8bb6e7aa3d56a1951d2b284a2ef894		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x109A2 12248 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001322a.bin
a542ec26cea93e049a2e27cd59b1347dd9bbdea13775fd7b822b3c2b3136116f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1322A 4324 bytes

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