Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c59885474d3876fe…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.5 KB
MD5: fd0c28da4b134da9871e5c7c991373b1 SHA-1: 1af10d5912afafda5805eda03f15edba320c36ad SHA-256: c59885474d3876fe504dc31cdd750fc1e6bd3fe42096132a3b1b7f61f3544b65
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated upon opening, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor. This is a common technique for delivering a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d0.bin
40af5848e576a95ca7ad76b9965b2f73bdbd974a3c0bde881a126909e1046ec1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD0 1965 bytes