Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c56194ef4281309e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.5 KB
MD5: 1826d436b19847362b2396d20dde2410 SHA-1: 3633556ca435c8559acfe71428f3761b53a9c969 SHA-256: c56194ef4281309ef85f1cd5d724ec9c3f93c6031edd6e92a3bdabd9e769a14a
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit this vulnerability for code execution. The presence of multiple \objdata sections further supports the exploitation of embedded objects.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ba.bin
773b1499c1b730baa3ae40e5c49b0491dc42c8aaa7b4a04a6304bd1fce0c9d0e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBA 1560 bytes