MALICIOUS
220
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
The sample exhibits characteristics of a malicious Office document, including XOR-encoded strings and references to Windows API functions like WinExec, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress. The presence of OLE slack space anomaly and embedded URLs, though benign in this instance, further supports a malicious intent. The obfuscated nature of the strings and the API calls suggest the document is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload.
Heuristics 6
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XOR-encoded strings (key 0x11) critical SC_XOR_ENCODEDFound 1 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x11: 'kernel32.dll'
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Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXECReference to WinExec API
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Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARYReference to LoadLibrary API
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Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESSReference to GetProcAddress API
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OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALYOLE file is 125,440 bytes but its declared streams total only 56,346 bytes — 69,094 bytes (55%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.microsoft.com
- https://www.verisign.com/rpa
- http://ocsp.verisign.com/ocsp/status0
- https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0
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