Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c54a003b56177651…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

95.5 KB Created: 2008-07-11 06:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: f4f6918867f8a08cf84e0f712e8da483 SHA-1: ee3e1e8ffe8e9a7bc3ad39f009ba08cd04ca9855 SHA-256: c54a003b5617765190f8d907197892e8589887bd0bc1c8c93a68ef42073cd578
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The OLE document exhibits anomalies, including a large unaccounted-for region and an appended executable payload. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to format issues, the presence of appended executable bytes strongly suggests the document is designed to deliver a secondary payload. The SHA256 hash is included as a primary indicator.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 97,792 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,543 bytes — 81,249 bytes (83%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.