Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c53a4390c9ba6953…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.5 KB
MD5: 57e18aa92cd4d4c1dc830a4475af433a SHA-1: 9a32ebba54fa061b242c989662cc2e26249f1524 SHA-256: c53a4390c9ba6953a6564058f4ec0c32ac62f5e8b715d4f31c0c4af4db17ebeb
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting client-side vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009d.bin
f7dea182bc09b02ceb6e809875ff6d375f9be869caccdbd732a44139824a5b1c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9D 1563 bytes