Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c52f07c0cb917d98…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.3 KB Created: 2021-09-05 17:19:55 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 6f3382fa4ae7ac4ca88de4dcb7684d0f SHA-1: d6bb757f5f27ccdb6570416a2191cc73a159d481 SHA-256: c52f07c0cb917d98375475715089a681d9e0c1fb92deaf49e52ab1977cc0664e
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file is identified as malicious by ClamAV and ML classifiers, indicating it contains a malicious script. The embedded script, disguised as metadata, contains text referencing "Powershell complete tutorial pdf", likely a lure to trick users into downloading and opening the file. The PDF also hosts numerous links on compromised websites, suggesting a phishing or credential harvesting attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://brodart01.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/k8m9b5fl1apn5lhje4i0e6v667/74598888923.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://www.hz-kontejnery.cz/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kinililirabufutobulo.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://dalaichau.com/files/89107072537.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://misterholidaysanprisco.it/userfiles/files/97692636934.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://festival-bg.com/media/ckuploads/files/63192482148.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.teppiche-waschen-hamburg.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607a555cf26da---42470737822.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sharpeningfactory.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612eced72beac---jegixad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jadeite.ru/images/file/22460401450.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://edukiya.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/468c76200931447f86356d28ab493d25/pelugumafupedif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://berallebags.com/UploadFiles/FCKeditor/20210626052724.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://landlorddebtadvisory.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e5e02nn9q3tcovm5o598hvah53/45525527244.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pilot-market.ru/new/files/file/72061247550.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.kinoimaging.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cac4f666a44---tizimanog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://progin.ch/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zilewuvudugifizikotedovi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://duetsepolno.pl/userfiles/file/dawika.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://infravoip.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f0a371c4b0c7a4759b53403b3c652f52/75358585338.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aeronautike.com/userfiles/file/xuneretafe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bikipvuikhoedep.com/app/webroot/files/editor_upload/files/kixitoxuregitadedokidivad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://samowar.ch/upload/file/31547215547.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dunajecbiala.pl/upload/File/40361349506.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sudaff.com/pics/file/wipurutisivipakimizoju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://carthink.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ae4410f2f19---menuzavamowekijuro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aplus.to/userfiles/file/40299119650.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://srividyaastrology.com/userfiles/file/tulokiguranesinaxevifason.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://longhoang.vn/upload/files/zotubojuwogepopuwuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://brodart01.com/wp-conIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/S30rS-6n6vg/uplcv?utm_term=powershell+complete+tutorial+pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00014ba3.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x14BA3 1701 bytes
SHA-256: d0ab4d0e72954877319c82c725e10e8e08a3b6505fb455d3d33ff6ea4f7529f7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='LibreOffice Draw'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Sijomo Jumobetulo</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell complete tutorial pdf. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Powershell complete tutorial pdf. &lt;/h2&gt;&lt;/center&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt; A curated list of delicious</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Powershell complete tutorial pdf. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Powershell complete tutorial pdf. &lt;/h2&gt;&lt;/center&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt; A curated list of delicious</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell complete tutorial pdf</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='LibreOffice Draw'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-02-27T04:26:25'
  xmp:CreatorTool='LibreOffice Draw'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='5bc1bfca-81d2-4d95-b6c7-f5324c9bd054'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='0859f23c-80b6-480a-9418-15e3339df554'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000e38c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE38C 17792 bytes
SHA-256: 40fe36534815d4874bad589788762033510e31960069294ebb254081eff5de78
font_01_sfnt_off0001117d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1117D 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00012994.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12994 10968 bytes
SHA-256: 13065764e0c8bbf08360794bf6bc97ac4118a94ffbe9a043387d8ee7412b98a5

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.