RTF malware analysis — malicious · c52cc6619beecf71

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.07 MB First seen: 2022-08-31

MD5: 1f16b33be0ca6c119026595c96e0c1d4 SHA-1: 2ee4287b97150bb4162d7a4d3efde8461b1af4a4 SHA-256: c52cc6619beecf711b7a1e77da1f217c6409d8df9c5d9d95d26c1b26b21b75bd

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882, specifically through the Equation Editor OLE object. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics strongly suggests that the file is designed to trigger this known vulnerability. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic indicates that the embedded OLE object is forced to activate, leading to arbitrary code execution. No specific malware family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with exploit-laced documents.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED

RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000129e.bin` `5a7492f965ef5084b82518771aeb882a99b17cd7d1ef299297f0246220cae422`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x129E	80268 bytes
`objdata_01_off000324ed.bin` `e1fc1a4c0e67e69e3fb71023b7446271b7980a05bfadf3f1c66142aaf4530e1c`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x324ED	187172 bytes

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