Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c4d762003814ee3a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

33.3 KB Created: 2020-10-25 19:42:15 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 6721e4d8e1553f22878e2cd41cab09f3 SHA-1: e5c02a63ef442086be75ab0158840f4021ce3ff4 SHA-256: c4d762003814ee3afc01505e724013c7548388e692975cfee7e505b256bca2f6
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with several pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The primary attack pattern involves luring users to external sites, which could host phishing content or initiate malware downloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/aws?keyword=tabeer+ur+roya+complete+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://dejuxowiku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738850/bafebo-lujato-dozoxigufi-fofaxudobisexox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zadumeredevasax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453870/3407316.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jikeberu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857846/9365270.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://besiwalufeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696214/71ae25ae70.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jovikuveditowe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874612/womosegezobigogud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368494/normal_5f897c8957f2a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4378621/normal_5f8eb8990d1f9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kavitokolezub/acute_decompensated_heart_failure.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tetazino/sizigim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/82c73e64-9909-4674-8ffa-7621833a735f/62978058852.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a74e3916-a221-4840-8400-c363aa612557/moon_magic_dj_conway.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/84f84aaf-d720-4412-92a3-004abd9a6817/tilizojoburuxamid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9917ae80-c8e6-4b78-a4f4-3dda92cc1630/bisibaxuzava.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0ad33396-4454-4263-adc9-b8d3d99a1f1a/20651269803.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xefejevife/ng_das_statistical_methods_free_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jamokaroxoj/how_to_use_japanese_abacus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xanebavifamopez/moxalu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xanebavifamopez/midifegojobadonorikipu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004674.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4674 5316 bytes
SHA-256: 59e992530348860154ca131d4753994a196030758f27dac9d3b02b2bb6b67c42
font_01_sfnt_off00005879.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5879 9288 bytes
SHA-256: 73deb9b84da9298b0d4ee56b26031e9a09ec88f64a03c398e1fcc0c000a53bf4

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