Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Heuristics 5

• ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7119787-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7119787-0
• Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
  A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
• OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
  OLE file is 19,200 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 19,200 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
• Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
  OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
• CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
  The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

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