Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c4b936635d4e8f4e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

76.8 KB Created: 2021-03-17 05:38:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: f470b06ec15af1da0f7085598b433b8e SHA-1: b4fe005abcf9caf09bddc00c459be46bb4d64e81 SHA-256: c4b936635d4e8f4e2ba3529b1770f4141648fe67b8c6bad790990756912beb7b
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The presence of an AutoOpen macro, along with critical heuristics for Shell() and WScript.Shell usage, indicates that the macros are designed to execute commands. The extracted artifact triage further suggests the presence of encoded blobs and script execution terms, pointing towards a downloader functionality. The macros likely download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
cab7775c5d69dd8abd2214a41b3d5657e2bc7c6475f24e909efe68039b9f5703
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3014 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
0db8d4882b73cfa910ac6168e440e6a7095acec2b20a18d9010f115490362329
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 30720 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.