PDF malware analysis — malicious · c4b6c851c1ee3ab8

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.7 KB Created: 2020-11-02 23:31:39 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14

MD5: e591350bcd752ef8ed578c186b5a7392 SHA-1: 23e65c39a47ed6e4f81898401e2268d651a319bd SHA-256: c4b6c851c1ee3ab8c4f6babd1fabc1ba318486965480ba2e8b541bf0736e53fa

94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains an embedded link to a known malicious redirector, which is a common tactic for phishing or malware distribution. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs suggest an attempt to lure the user to a malicious site, likely disguised as a document related to the search query found in the URL.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 3

PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK

PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://gettraff.ru/123?keyword=hatsan+125+sniper+vortex+qe+25+cal In PDF document text
- https://lujisitezolip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134109273/xurejixixe.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://keniwuki.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483234/32e063a95e.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://zegojipoxe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069766/bb2cac.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://nudojafobedem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379550/676684.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://pitimonajavigo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383860/6854522.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0499/3931/6894/files/vikevilugenira.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/rexogeguxosix/princeton_academy_online.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0501/9346/5522/files/97226144930.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8d600134-2987-497e-84a1-b1c6148be919/thomas_calculus_early_transcendentals_12th_edition_slader.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`font_00_sfnt_off00006903.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6903	5452 bytes
SHA-256: `7acda365517dd35f24ff5023b96f2b00ffbe4598877d2a68b6347b62ee989c98`
`font_01_sfnt_off00007bb5.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7BB5	11344 bytes
SHA-256: `b5f6dadbab20e1dfa90d7e1376197b44eba5385d4cfb04fc67c046adde96e3b0`

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