Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c478e466940ddb8a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.6 KB Created: 2020-10-11 08:53:59 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-10
MD5: 0d29d6faac5427e3fceea8254e8eaae6 SHA-1: 4cb59827cb57b5a55ad8d1791d980ddc07fde2eb SHA-256: c478e466940ddb8a3114b92e52ac5c1b8ec6f975d83a36ad45b8f59bf968b0d9
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=ennavale+ennai+maranthathu+yeno+mp3 In PDF document text
    • https://site-1036939.mozfiles.com/files/1036939/rutowaditegaxulixuligap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038331.mozfiles.com/files/1038331/gubenugozumefu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038601.mozfiles.com/files/1038601/28666551545.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043115.mozfiles.com/files/1043115/73783030031.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://petojab.overcomingandunderstandinghomosexuality.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453453/favawudunimi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1042978.mozfiles.com/files/1042978/mekisatonixepol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039424.mozfiles.com/files/1039424/berote.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037241.mozfiles.com/files/1037241/nasoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036772.mozfiles.com/files/1036772/70878955482.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1ac31215-919a-4e92-aaef-69c39d407935/muragubovusemini.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/aa1c46c3-0918-474b-bffa-b5c73a6f589b/nojise.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b4d48723-ce39-4695-870f-59a7b5114772/52068536021.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a7b578ed-3bcb-4e8d-b3e3-c1736571d1e2/kibapi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d05769f7-f567-4edb-8387-c4894fb29dbf/gunetoxewumebetu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bit.ly/2zL11GLIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005b5e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5B5E 5164 bytes
SHA-256: 7b25f2f04341df1b46ed67f236b6a9359a3fd0c4fcf602bbd703e98a901240cd
font_01_sfnt_off00006cd1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6CD1 14496 bytes
SHA-256: 69f7c386762174b7b4efde62fe9a8c7ec26ef3695a3607432274b41100d62d44

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