Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c46bb9913b4243d4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.3 KB Created: 2021-03-22 15:06:28 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 3721c2a41caa9ff961b93f7ff5d03067 SHA-1: 839da2ac41134e1bdb04e812870d57d2c3727fec SHA-256: c46bb9913b4243d4ae5ab102371fa522aadc907aa2794782f0813841ba1b1a1e
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links pointing to other PDF files hosted on various disposable domains, indicating a link farm. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or SEO manipulation. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links are indicative of an attempt to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jumiwimov.ru/wix?keyword=easy+mandolin+chord+chart+pdf
    • http://padojobimo.mywebcommunity.org/nisapivumozupuditibi.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4365655/normal_5ff0bdf3554cd.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4456671/normal_5fdcec709aa5d.pdf
    • https://kikoxelila.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134335894/xiguginato.pdf
    • https://namulore.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134017746/fivabisod-wimalujubo-bosono.pdf
    • http://zogometemo.sportsontheweb.net/pumunigasufigataxu.pdf
    • https://nupigefaxobabu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070289/vefekimudanexos_bituva_xepatumilak.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/bemapebe/hhiehjY/bewodivozadivuverefijol.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/lokiwejawe/djiieia/71470054646.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4489850/normal_5fe939811bd16.pdf
    • https://xutareziwax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135327408/buvevokubak.pdf
    • https://falatunasozenu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134762474/zuvobi.pdf
    • https://vejevidumuruje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135302175/dufabel-lisenu.pdf
    • https://vijunisuli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775087/439c77.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4404108/normal_5ff188070f678.pdf
    • http://fatunatet.getenjoyment.net/coffee_shop_business_plan_download.pdf
    • https://famipitep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134355151/9633614.pdf
    • https://milonotupilo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135347339/aa34aa011b2f.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4475208/normal_600cb4f83257e.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pekatikisuruki/is_an_8ft_trampoline_big_enough.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jupudizadid/64155089065.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mosezavor/77354289155.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xukirizugukugi/my_maths_ks3_homework_book_answers.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e69b.bin
952d89564301d627cc6c1486b3c6f74655e20ecdfba8c3342b1a6746419424f4
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE69B 5124 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f7d2.bin
4c2e3e8a6ea7cb30b3442b62f7f736a75eb70282c852f50084d51719fb82c1e5
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF7D2 10936 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00011d51.bin
05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11D51 4324 bytes