RTF malware analysis — malicious · c46900d8ec9729ca

MALICIOUS

RTF

28.1 KB First seen: 2022-12-15

MD5: f6db6f9baf0b962f002500b83d0abc5d SHA-1: b7543cebab50fab48b6d91ba49e62762fc01c917 SHA-256: c46900d8ec9729ca6a1e50d4e9fabfa731921b8afd52e63597df73276f28b1a0

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object and an Equation Editor exploit, indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJDATA heuristics. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable editing, which would trigger the OLE object's activation and likely exploit a vulnerability. The primary IOC is the file's SHA256 hash.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000582c.bin` `64951e4c00a908749ac33909c757db63a6b319030cf6ba939d864b1593cc5438`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x582C	1770 bytes

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