Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c4642064c03f6d8f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

53.1 KB Created: 2020-08-21 05:03:13 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: fa6d0bc3d8da431888e9ba549aac8f34 SHA-1: 0dd928407eba4c0d229cf748c0e83b24dc949d9c SHA-256: c4642064c03f6d8faeb6aa838115a7bb2e9615cf7ee55f416d7b984b460994ff
152 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a link farm with numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to Shopify domains hosting other PDFs. One critical heuristic identified a link to a known malicious redirector at 'https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=iit+kharagpur+virtual+lab+simulator'. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious verdict. The document body itself contains obfuscated text and the redirector URL, suggesting an attempt to disguise the malicious intent. The primary attack pattern involves redirecting users through malicious infrastructure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=iit+kharagpur+virtual+lab+simulator
    • http://files.rjvillaflor.net/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637190/labokazuvop.pdf
    • http://jofufakov.dhsdrama.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740249/wekimolagusi-dazinoleko.pdf
    • http://files.newhavenrocketsbasketball.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398093/fe914edc3e.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/6544/9371/files/foperaze.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/mudamizoxudaxusuzo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0065/1158/files/past_perfect_tense_worksheet_with_answers.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0458/1418/6150/files/paposotaxavuka.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2442/4853/files/bonibub.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3193/6674/files/jebikalufireritef.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/9969/0910/files/ap_world_history_outline.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5031/1579/files/polibes.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8651/9208/files/tekadinofatemenudimelu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/6162/2437/files/bank_of_america_credit_card_statement.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7235/6513/files/bkav_pro_android_crack.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/6336/2204/files/cathode_ray_oscilloscope_experiment_report.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006e57.bin
804f6029e0f9061d5952aa2b7db1be46d7d742a592717438143da3eb346a7ff7		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E57 5092 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007f9d.bin
0f427746ea4f8b80f041ef8657b21834a3c15b5216119b30953a8a2bb841bc00		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7F9D 10476 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000a3ab.bin
757edbe9ca696dc752e8794cc2fab55b744a24b197aba41abea0c8f583a0f3ca		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA3AB 16116 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0000b887.bin
cd94ef65598b1866d0653cdd88243d989fd81359c0e770c2d3a4858f1c2f6d34		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB887 4324 bytes

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