RTF malware analysis — malicious · c429798a8ac10886

MALICIOUS

RTF

87.2 KB First seen: 2024-07-30

MD5: f781d204ec1279f75a5cc307a7617260 SHA-1: ab4c056c078ed8a23910052a900b3520cd312248 SHA-256: c429798a8ac10886092d53354c19e904d330eae5185113392c7287c06c28868b

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening the document, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, hence the high confidence in an exploitation attempt.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000519.bin` `771bf865f7478d6d91ba3586a83b713115ed3591f8fb9d37b1d50c022996275e`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x519	1926 bytes

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